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Electronic discovery is rapidly expanding, exceeding its role as 
merely a routine part of litigation.  It is included in the litigation process 
from the beginning at the parties’ required meet-and-confer during the 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference and potentially through the end of the 
case during the taxation of costs in favor of the prevailing party as per-
mitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).  This rule allows the prevailing party to 
recover certain costs, subject to limitation by court rule, federal statute, 
or other court order.  Courts are divided as to whether the costs of elec-
tronic discovery may be assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).  Who will 
bear the costs, and how much of that cost may be shifted to the losing 
party, are common questions.  However, courts are divided on the type 
and amount of costs that may be recovered by the prevailing party.  The 
courts in favor of taxing electronic costs view electronic discovery as 
unavoidable due to the highly technical nature of the work as well as the 
efficiencies of having experts compile the data.
1
  Courts taking a contrary 
view hold that Congressional intent in cost-shifting does not include dis-
covery obligations such as producing electronically stored information 
(“ESI”) or preproduction steps.
2
 
During discovery information stored electronically may be pro-
duced and may include “email, web pages, word processing files, audio 
and video files, images, computer databases, and virtually anything that 
is stored on a computing device – including but not limited to servers, 
desktops, laptops, cell phones, hard drives, flash drives, PDAs and MP3 
players.”
3
  The Sedona Conference sets forth six areas in which e-
discovery is different than paper discovery: (1) volume and duplicability, 
(2) persistence, (3) dynamic and changeable content, (4) metadata, (5) 
environment-dependence and obsolescence, and (6) dispersion and 
searchability.
4
  Not only is e-discovery voluminous, potentially in the 
millions of pages, but it is replicated and stored in different locations, 
each a potential source of relevant information.  Similarly, each copy or 
change may be logged by the computer or software, which may create 
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several different copies of the same document albeit with different in-
formation such as edits or changes.  Producing this information to the 
opposing party may be as easy as compiling documents in their native 
format or may be complicated enough to require a third-party vendor to 
assist in locating, identifying, and producing the information.  In the lat-
ter situation, the question arises – is the locating, identifying, and produc-
ing information akin to paper copying?  Or has technology yet again 
stepped ahead of the law? 
I. TAXATION OF COSTS – THE RACE TIRE DECISION 
The federal rules permit a prevailing party to receive costs, exclud-
ing attorney’s fees, “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court or-
der provides otherwise.”
5
  Congress, in codifying 28 U.S.C. § 1920 “de-
fine[d] the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d).”
6
  Section 1920 provides 
that a federal judge or clerk may assess certain costs, including “[f]ees 
for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials 
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”
7
 
Most recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered what 
“necessarily obtained for use in the case” meant in relation to electronic 
discovery in the Race Tires decision.  Race Tires asserted claims against 
Hoosier Racing Tire Corporation and Dirt Motor Sports for purportedly 
violating portions of the Sherman Act in the creation of the “single tire” 
rule in contracts between Hoosier as the supplier and Dirt Motor Sports 
as the licensing body.
8
  The issue on appeal was whether $365,000 in 
fees by third party vendors “covering such activities as hard drive imag-
ing, data processing, keyword searching, and file format conversion, are 
taxable, without differentiating between those charges that constitute fees 




In holding that only “scanning and file format conversion [could] be 
considered to be making copies” the Race Tires Court considered the 
history behind section 1920 in their resolution of the case.
10
  Congress 
codified section 1920 as a modern descendant of the Fee Act of 1853.  
One concern that prompted the Act was the different outcomes in cases 
with assessed costs against litigants and the “exorbitant fees” awarded to 
the prevailing party.
11
  Congress created the Act with specific limitations 
on the types and amounts of fees that could be changed.  The Act marked 
a departure from the English Rule, which required reimbursement of all 
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fees to the prevailing party, with the American Rule, which allowed re-
covery of some but not all fees.
12
  The Act was “included in the Revised 
Judicial Code of 1948 as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923(a).”
13
  The Race 
Tires Court next considered the parameters of a party to recover for mak-
ing copies by considering the common use of the term. 
Important to the Race Tires Court was the use of the broader term 
“materials” in the statute which “plainly signifie[d] that § 1920(4)’s al-
lowance for copying costs is not limited to paper copying.”
14
  The court 
grouped the third-party vendor’s services into five categories: “collecting 
and preserving ESI; processing and indexing ESI; keyword searching of 
ESI for responsive and privileged documents; converting native files to 
TIFF; and scanning paper documents to create electronic images.”
15
  In 
rejecting a majority of charges as not recoverable under section 1920, the 
court noted that costs allowable under Rule 54(d)(1) are limited by the 
statute.  The court emphasized that not all costs are recoverable, and par-
ties are often responsible for the cost and burden of responding to dis-
covery.
16
  In breaking down the electronic discovery process, the Race 
Tires Court differentiated review and production as non-taxable while 
converting native files to TIFF files was taxable.
17
 
II. TAXATION OF COSTS – THE OTHER CIRCUITS’ APPROACH 
Courts do not uniformly assess costs under section 1920.  The Third 
Circuit determined that Congress did not intend section 1920(4) to allow 
recovery of all costs related to producing electronic documents, only 
those related to creating a copy.  Therefore, the approach in Race Tires 
disallows costs for “gathering, preserving, processing, searching, culling, 
and extracting ESI” because that “simply do[es] not amount to making 
copies.”
18
  The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals takes a different view.  
In that circuit, the absence of a cost-sharing agreement for creating a 
database to review ESI would have been taxable in favor of the prevail-
ing party under section 1920(4).
19
 
The Ricoh Court took a broader view of document production than 
“only printing and Bates-labeling a document.”
20
  In that case, the parties 
agreed to split the costs of a third party vendor who would create a se-
cure database to produce the ESI in its native format.  At the end of the 
case, the prevailing party moved the court to tax costs, including its por-
tion of the database cost, against the other party.  The court cited the 
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2008 amendment to section 1920(4) changed from “copies of papers” to 
“copies of any materials … to reflect the idea that electronically pro-
duced information is recoverable in court costs.”
21
  If the parties would 
not have agreed to share the costs of a database, the prevailing party 
would have been able to recover its portion of the cost because the doc-
uments were produced in their native format.
22
  Similarly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals permitted a prevailing party recovery of its cost for 




The American Rule generally requires the prevailing party to shoul-
der the burden of producing documents or ESI in discovery, subject to a 
limited ability to tax costs at the end of the case.  Section 1920(4) allows 
a prevailing party to recover “fees for exemplification and the costs of 
making copies of any materials.”
24
  Whether electronic discovery falls 
within either exemplification or making copies is unclear. So far, the 
United States Supreme Court has declined to wade into the fray.  The 
courts that have addressed taxation of costs in this context are divided.  
In the Third Circuit, identifying, culling, processing, and reviewing ESI 
is not a cost that would be reimbursed for paper copies, much less elec-
tronic copies.  Therefore, only costs associated with scanning or making 
the ESI available in its native format are recoverable.  In the Federal and 
Fifth Circuits, the courts have taken a broader view.  Those circuits allow 
costs to be recovered in the information gathering and processing steps 
as costs incurred initially by the prevailing party.  To best protect a cli-
ent, parties should consider an agreement outlining exactly who pays for 
the costs of ESI, including the identifying, culling, and processing.  Such 
a cost-shifting agreement may allow the parties to allocate the costs be-
tween them in a manner they view as fair under the circumstances and 
avoid the uncertainty within this area of the law. 
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